Political and economic cooperation between Gulf and North African countries will likely continue in 2023. This will probably be centred on backing key strongmen such as President Sisi in Egypt or Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan in Sudan as it is in Gulf countries’ strategic interest to support stability there. Gulf investments will be focused on infrastructure, renewables and agriculture. But these investments carry security risks associated with land disputes and communal violence.

China and Russia are likely to view EU retrenchment from North Africa as an opportunity to build influence on Europe’s southern border. We anticipate further Chinese investments in infrastructure and Russian cooperation over security, driving North African countries to take their side on key global issues. Russia is also likely to use grain supplies to shore up support. This is already the case with Algeria, but could extend to Tunisia, Egypt and Libya if Western assistance drops in 2023.

Political, economic and security cooperation between Egypt and Turkiye in 2023 would very probably reduce diplomatic and military tensions in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. A direct line of communication between them means regional disputes are likely to be resolved without fallout, such as cutting diplomatic relations or halting trade.  

Public spending on new critical infrastructure, maintenance or improvements to existing services is very likely to decline next year, with state budgets squeezed. And China has indicated it may reduce its infrastructure investments to fragile states, opting for more secure destinations such as the Gulf. This will leave a gap in investment in critical infrastructure. As such, countries in the region will probably face continued disruptions to utilities and to public service provision.