Mis- and dis-information campaigns by Russia-affiliated groups will probably increasingly focus on Western interests, driving a range of threats. Evidence of information campaigns driving anti-foreigner (and particularly anti-French) sentiment has already emerged in Mali, the CAR and Chad. And protests over the perceived illegitimate exploitation of resources will probably recur as corruption persists and socio-economic conditions remain poor. Closer regional ties with Russia mean governments are likely to increasingly favour Russian companies and potentially try to cancel contracts with Western firms.

Poor socio-economic conditions will probably aid recruitment by jihadist groups. The authorities in Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria have prioritised military approaches to counter these groups, rather than addressing socio-economic concerns. Armed groups have also been able to offer alternative structures of governance. Jihadist groups operating in the Sahel are likely to further expand their presence in 2023. Their attacks will probably mainly involve ambushes on security forces. But jihadists in Mali, Nigeria and Burkina Faso appear increasingly intent on targeting capital cities.

The continued involvement of military actors in politics and delays in the implementation of transitional timetables for a return to civilian rule will be a source of instability. Potential splits within military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad will probably spur further attempted coups by dissenting military factions. Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the CAR will also likely be prone to further military interference. Periodic internet and communication networks shutdowns during periods of heightened political tensions and bouts of unrest are also likely to continue to disrupt business operations.