A resurgence of anti-establishment sentiment and agitation in Europe is likely in 2022, amid uneven national recoveries from the pandemic. Weakened economies, public disaffection with mainstream political parties, and a probable rise in immigration will provide opportunities for the many political actors that seek to change the status quo in Europe. Populist parties, extremists on the left and right, and hostile foreign governments are all likely to exploit grievances and economic vulnerabilities to further their agendas.

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Populist parties, extremists on the left and right, and hostile foreign governments are all likely to exploit grievances and economic vulnerabilities to further their agendas.

Europe enters 2022 in a weakened state, albeit with more resilient prospects for economic recovery than many other regions. It is also likely to be a year of relative continuity with little change at upcoming national elections, with the exception of  Viktor Orban's government in Hungary, facing the highest chance of an electoral defeat since 2010. But this does not mean Europe will escape political turbulence. Countries across the continent face multiple threats to their recovery and 2022 is likely to be a year where crises on several fronts will test the EU.

New Covid-19 outbreaks and ongoing disruption to global supply chains, and particularly energy supplies, are the main factors that could derail or low growth and compound a raft of other issues that threaten discord. These risk factors for Europe as a whole are heavily interconnected to the recovery and stability prospects of other regions, which themselves are pegged to wider negative geopolitical trends and instability. 

The increasingly competitive and adversarial nature of international relations, not least between Russia, China and the United States, but also by smaller states in Europe’s near abroad will almost certainly have a direct impact on how Europe fares in the coming year. Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria and the Western Balkan states, are particularly vulnerable to crises in 2022 that the EU can ill afford and seems poorly equipped to prevent.

Greece-Turkey tensions

The eastern Mediterranean is a potential crisis flashpoint in 2022 amid territorial disputes over gas reserves. The three key issues to track as sources of tensions between Greece and Turkey remain the unification of Cyprus, gas exploration rights, and maritime border disputes. A specific development that would probably lead to naval deployments and risks of confrontation is the exclusion of Turkey from gas production and distribution deals between Israel, Greece and Egypt. This would probably lead to Ankara ramping up provocative exploration operations in Greek waters.

Trade union activism

There was a slump in trade unions’ mobilisation in Europe in 2020 amid widespread lockdowns. Rising unemployment and inflation rates make a sharp rise of industrial activism more likely, particularly as these converge with an easing of Covid-19-related restrictions and furlough schemes. A slower than anticipated economic recovery, with growth levels staying below 1-2%, may lead governments to implement austerity measures that in turn would point to strikes and walk-outs being more likely. Job losses and higher costs for businesses would also make it harder for these to meet demands from unions.

Libertarian terrorism

The growing infusion of libertarian ideologies among radical political movements would push up the potential for violence at demonstrations and acts of terrorism. Extremist groups have been promoting anti-state and anti-globalist ideas catalysing opposition to Covid-19 restrictions and vaccinations. Most actions have been limited to activism and civil disobedience so far. But the tying together of radical ideologies on both the extreme left and right has led to a proliferation of conspiracy theories, and with this, calls for violence against ‘global corrupt political and economic elites’.