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With Turkey preoccupied with domestic issues and Russia taking a less antagonistic stance internationally, we view a conflict between the two as being highly improbable.
Kyrgyzstan is also likely to draw Russia into a more active diplomatic role. We warn that a popular uprising and collapse of the government there looks probable in 2022. The country has slid into ever greater authoritarianism since Sadyr Japarov became president in January 2021, with him also tacitly allowing organised criminal groups to operate. Weakened institutions and the centralisation of power in the presidency has now set the stage for a major crisis. A rise in drug production in Afghanistan will probably further raise the stakes for political power in Kyrgyzstan given its position on a key smuggling route.
There are two broad scenarios by which such a crisis in Kyrgyzstan could evolve. These are not mutually exclusive, and one may precipitate another. The first is a split involving the government and security services that leads to a power grab either by force or the establishment of a rival administration. This may come about through discontent with the power of organised criminal groups, or through factions seeking to increase their influence and so boost their share of revenue from corruption and drug smuggling.
A second scenario that we assess there is a reasonable possibility of is a popular uprising. This could stem from an insurgency in southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the area around Osh, or from broader protests over graft and the weak socio-economic situation. We forecast that the poor economy will lead the government to try to expropriate assets from foreign businesses, particularly in the extractives sector. Such attempts to gain quick cash are unlikely to prevent social unrest threatening government stability. Either way, we doubt that President Japarov will be in office at the end of the year.
Turkey also faces serious challenges from both its people and the state of its economy in 2022. An outlier scenario that we assess is within reasonable plausibility is initially peaceful protests evolving into a regime-threatening crisis. Inflation is rising and apparently out of control, now standing at around 20% a year. This is wearing down people’s living standards and their backing for the government. There are also signs that President Erdogan has become less adept at managing his opponents. And as he has centralised decision-making to a small group in the presidency he is making what seem to be increasingly clumsy domestic moves.
We doubt that a protest campaign alone would threaten the government, but it is instead the state’s response that we will be monitoring closely. Mr Erdogan has typically responded to demonstrations forcefully, and the government’s clumsy handling of opposition in the past year leads us to assess that a particularly overt and violent crackdown would be probable. Aside from exacerbating any ongoing protests, such a move would also be likely to prompt splits in government. We highly doubt that this will lead to a collapse of Mr Erdogan’s government, but it is likely to be a difficult year for him to navigate.
On a broader scale, there is some potential for unrest and possible government instability in Turkey to have a net positive impact on regional stability. We have long assessed that rivalry between second-order powers such as Russia and Turkey has become more likely to result in conflict. Last year we flagged the Black Sea as an area where such a conflict between the two could occur. But with Turkey preoccupied with domestic issues and Russia taking a less antagonistic stance internationally, we view a conflict between the two as being highly improbable.
Eurasia stands from most other regions as one in which the preponderance of autocratic regimes keeps many countries hostage to the ever-present likelihood of crises arising whenever they feel threatened. The absence of real opposition, the hollowed-out nature of states, poor governance and vulnerability to capricious decisions all make any forecasts of relative quiet and stability risky, and prone to prove wrong when stressors erupt. A calm and secure Eurasia relies heavily upon control, suppression, and money. Protecting near-term economic growth seems to be what will shape the will of the region’s strongmen in 2022.◼
The World Bank has said inflation
in Turkey will hover around 15%
in 2022.
With Turkey preoccupied with domestic issues and Russia taking a less antagonistic stance internationally, we view a conflict between the two as being highly improbable.
The World Bank has said inflation
in Turkey will hover around 15%
in 2022.
Turkey also faces serious challenges from both its people and the state of its economy in 2022. An outlier scenario that we assess is within reasonable plausibility is initially peaceful protests evolving into a regime-threatening crisis. Inflation is rising and apparently out of control, now standing at around 20% a year. This is wearing down people’s living standards and their backing for the government. There are also signs that President Erdogan has become less adept at managing his opponents. And as he has centralised decision-making to a small group in the presidency he is making what seem to be increasingly clumsy domestic moves.
We doubt that a protest campaign alone would threaten the government, but it is instead the state’s response that we will be monitoring closely. Mr Erdogan has typically responded to demonstrations forcefully, and the government’s clumsy handling of opposition in the past year leads us to assess that a particularly overt and violent crackdown would be probable. Aside from exacerbating any ongoing protests, such a move would also be likely to prompt splits in government. We highly doubt that this will lead to a collapse of Mr Erdogan’s government, but it is likely to be a difficult year for him to navigate.
On a broader scale, there is some potential for unrest and possible government instability in Turkey to have a net positive impact on regional stability. We have long assessed that rivalry between second-order powers such as Russia and Turkey has become more likely to result in conflict. Last year we flagged the Black Sea as an area where such a conflict between the two could occur. But with Turkey preoccupied with domestic issues and Russia taking a less antagonistic stance internationally, we view a conflict between the two as being highly improbable.
Eurasia stands from most other regions as one in which the preponderance of autocratic regimes keeps many countries hostage to the ever-present likelihood of crises arising whenever they feel threatened. The absence of real opposition, the hollowed-out nature of states, poor governance and vulnerability to capricious decisions all make any forecasts of relative quiet and stability risky, and prone to prove wrong when stressors erupt. A calm and secure Eurasia relies heavily upon control, suppression, and money. Protecting near-term economic growth seems to be what will shape the will of the region’s strongmen in 2022.◼
Kyrgyzstan is also likely to draw Russia into a more active diplomatic role. We warn that a popular uprising and collapse of the government there looks probable in 2022. The country has slid into ever greater authoritarianism since Sadyr Japarov became president in January 2021, with him also tacitly allowing organised criminal groups to operate. Weakened institutions and the centralisation of power in the presidency has now set the stage for a major crisis. A rise in drug production in Afghanistan will probably further raise the stakes for political power in Kyrgyzstan given its position on a key smuggling route.
There are two broad scenarios by which such a crisis in Kyrgyzstan could evolve. These are not mutually exclusive, and one may precipitate another. The first is a split involving the government and security services that leads to a power grab either by force or the establishment of a rival administration. This may come about through discontent with the power of organised criminal groups, or through factions seeking to increase their influence and so boost their share of revenue from corruption and drug smuggling.
A second scenario that we assess there is a reasonable possibility of is a popular uprising. This could stem from an insurgency in southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the area around Osh, or from broader protests over graft and the weak socio-economic situation. We forecast that the poor economy will lead the government to try to expropriate assets from foreign businesses, particularly in the extractives sector. Such attempts to gain quick cash are unlikely to prevent social unrest threatening government stability. Either way, we doubt that President Japarov will be in office at the end of the year.