Among the downsides are that Gulf states’ regional foreign policies appear fragmented, opaque and reactive compared with those formulated by the US. This reflects not just the lack of experience and the often narrow and closed circles of decision-makers behind them, but also a lack of dependable local partners. Gulf disengagement from Lebanon in late 2021 exemplified how regional policy decisions made by these states are likely to play out. Prompted by a seemingly minor spat over statements made by a new cabinet minister, Saudi Arabia announced a ban on Lebanese imports in short order, aiming to weaken Hezbollah. 

Lebanese parliamentary elections in early 2022 will be the strongest indication yet as to the extent to which Hezbollah’s supporter base has become isolated from the political leadership, but we remain doubtful that there will be significant structural change this year or next. This also demonstrates the shortcomings of a foreign policy focused on fairly short term interests, storing up instability over the long term. There are glimmers of hope for Lebanon. Even amid high tensions, it seems unlikely that rival factions will be able to coalesce into sufficiently organised blocs in 2022 to engage in overt armed conflict. 

Over the coming year we forecast that Lebanon will become increasingly disconnected from the wider region and locked in a spiral of decline. This is partly a result of the disengagement of Gulf states, but also because the prospects for recovery from its current economic crisis are so remote. Social disorder, multiple humanitarian crises, armed clashes and other symptoms of state collapse will probably be commonplace, including in Beirut. There seem few outside powers with much interest in helping Lebanon get back on its feet. 

Indeed, across the Levant, weakened economies and decaying state infrastructure will make countries troublesome to operate in and prone to environmental crises, violent crime and civil disorder. In the more transactional era of Middle Eastern politics, the weaker Levantine states that have less to bring to the table look at risk of being left even further behind by the wealthier regional powers, and becoming far more dependent on the support of multilateral institutions that themselves are weakening. The new era of realpolitik in the region is unlikely to be benevolent.◼

The withdrawal of much of the US military from the Middle East, and the years-long decline of US political engagement more broadly, is driving the Gulf states to conduct their relations with the rest of the region from a similarly transactional perspective. As an alternative regional superpower, China prefers to leave regional states to resolve their own problems. These changes are making regional foreign policy less ideological and sectarian, and more pragmatic. This has both positive and negative implications, although it does not necessarily make it more likely that regional powers will be able to resolve intractable disputes on their own. 

On the upside, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are likely to directly engage in and seek to resolve conflicts. One discernible pattern that we forecast will extend across the region is that the Gulf states will most probably reach out to potential new allies that are not aligned with Iran. Notable examples include Iraqi Shia nationalist parties and the Syrian Baath Party under Bashar Al-Assad. For both Syria and Iraq this is likely to open up new economic opportunities, albeit leaning towards long-term energy-focused projects with limited impact in the near term.


Another positive outcome from this kind of engagement is that it will put the Gulf countries and Iran at less direct odds, further dialing down regional conflict risks. Iran too is likely to change the way that it interacts with regional allies. This is in response to a combination of Iranian public anger about Tehran spending funds abroad, but also a realisation that even stalwart partners like Lebanese Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq in Iraq will prioritise domestic power politics over Iran’s strategic objectives, namely countering the US and Israel. Warnings by the latter suggest that Iran will increasingly rely on small units conducting drone warfare when it wishes to use proxies to apply pressure or influence events.

The shifting Iranian position reflects changes on the ground, not least in Iraq, where ostensibly Iran-backed militia groups are focused on pursuing domestic interests and political power. The aftermath of the 2021 parliamentary elections and subsequent drawn-out government formation process will shape the outlook in Iraq over the coming year. We forecast that a long-brewing confrontation between such militias and the elected authorities is likely to come to a head in 2022. This is likely to involve some violence, particularly rioting, assassinations and other violent attacks, but we doubt that it will reach the level of more serious civil conflict.

Several NGOs have said that 12m people in Iraq and Syria will lose access to water, food and electricity over the next few years.