Generals in North Africa and the Sahel are by no means political novices, but in Tunisia and Morocco they will almost certainly remain on the sidelines of power for now. This is despite both armies benefitting from increasing funding over the last decade or so. Little real political change is likely to happen in Morocco, where power ultimately remains with the king and those that surround him, with the civilian government primarily implementing policy decisions. Tunisia is likely to move in a similar direction this year, with President Saied consolidating his control over an authoritarian presidential system. Beyond 2022 we anticipate that he will use the army to suppress any serious challenge to his authority.

In Egypt and Algeria, where military dominance of civilian politics and government is prevalent and deeply established, we assess that the political and governance systems will remain resilient and stable in 2022. This is despite any internal and external political pressures that may arise. Having weathered Covid-19 and related economic crises, particularly slumps in the oil and gas prices and tourism, militaries in both countries stand to reap the reward of rebounding growth. 

Growth will in turn strengthen the already sizeable economic resources the Egyptian and Algerian regimes absorb to underwrite military power and keep a lid on stability. Algeria spends almost as much as a proportion of its GDP on the military as the US, the global leader. The Egyptian army controls vast areas of the economy, and in the last few years in particular has benefitted from state investments in the new administrative capital megaproject. The payoff from all this funding is that the grip on power of both regimes is tight, but also that longstanding inequalities and misgovernance are perpetuating, trapping these countries in long term cycles of discontent and hardship. 

Over the coming year North African and Sahelian states are facing a handful of actual or likely to emerge conflicts with regional implications. These conflicts are civil war in Ethiopia, disputes over water control related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, an intensifying confrontation between Morocco and Algeria over the sovereignty of the Western Sahara, and the continued and heightened potential for factional fighting and even civil conflict in Libya. None of the wider region’s governments appear to view it as in their interests, or even politically incumbent upon them, to overtly intervene in these conflicts.

We also assess that the region’s militaries are likely to oppose direct and overt intervention. That is not least because open warfare would expose deficiencies in their military forces that are primarily trained in counter-terrorism, border security, and internal security. But also because other options to regional states and militaries are available. Among the scenarios that are likely to occur are high-profile manoeuvres, exercises and other show-of-force deployments to contested regions, including southern Sudan, western Egypt, and the Algeria-Morocco border. We also forecast that the Egyptian and Algerian militaries will seek to bolster allied armies and factions with training, and weapons in Libya and in the Sahel.

Still, such regional conflicts are very likely to prove a useful distraction for regimes struggling with domestic issues. Egypt has tended to ramp up its rhetoric on the GERD when facing pressure from rural constituents on long term water shortages. Heightened rhetoric and retaliatory measures by Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara in 2021 came at a time when both countries were struggling with Covid-19 induced hardship. The potential for these conflicts, and other residual security threats such as terrorism, to escalate in 2022 will provide a narrative for the highly securitised politics that keeps the militaries in control, and democracy at bay. ◼

Moroccan military expenditure increased by more than half over the past ten years.