Immigration is another highly charged topic that we anticipate populist and right-wing parties will exploit as they look to build public support through 2022.Crises and conflicts outside of Europe, such as in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, are likely to drive more people to seek to reach the continent. And amid economic challenges and perceptions that migrants cause an excessive financial and social burden, a rise in xenophobia, racism and hate crime and extreme right wing terorism looks very likely, with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Poland, and France particular countries to watch.

The challenge of migration is one the EU's most intractable political dilemmas and vulnerabilities. The exploitation of migrants by the Belarusian government in late 2021 to pressure the EU into lifting sanctions, by drawing in refugees and diverting them to its border with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland speaks to this vulnerability, and the kind of state behaviour that Europe is increasingly likely to face. As it has in the past, we also anticipate that Turkey will modulate the flow of people into Europe to gain leverage over the EU, most likely as part of a long-running dispute between Turkey and Greece over gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. 

The governments of Belarus and Turkey are not the only authoritarian states in Europe’s near abroad that look to exert leverage by coercive means. Russia will continue to occupy a critical role in European security and growth prospects, not least in the security of energy supplies. EU-Russian relations going into 2022 are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold war, and are likely to deteriorate further in 2022. The buildup of Russian forces near eastern Ukraine in late 2021 suggests another crisis may unfold there by mid-2022 that the EU, which is reluctant to impose further sanctions on Russia, seems unable to deter.

These sorts of external challenges show how systematically exposed the EU will be in 2022 to wider geopolitical instability and weakening rule of law in the international system. And it shows the dilemmas ahead for European governments if they fail to manage the risks that threaten the integrity of the EU and its economic recovery. Yet their collective willingness and ability to do so in 2022 looks limited indeed. In many ways, the harder the EU tries to avoid crises as it tries to recover from the last, the more likely they will probably become.

Black Americans have died of Covid-19 at 1.4 times the rate of white Americans during the pandemic, according to a tracking project.

Amid these political currents, other issues are also becoming charged in Europe. The climate crisis has accelerated anti-capitalist activism, with movements such as Extinction Rebellion openly pursuing ideological issues beyond the environment. Alongside disruptive direct actions and street protests, higher-impact risks now stem from employee activism. Protest groups are likely to promote whistleblowing and the leaking of sensitive information. Belgium, France, Germany,Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK are where these groups are most active and are already pushing this approach.

Trade unions will probably also play a greater role in 2022 amid wide changes in working arrangements and conditions, and pressures on employers to adapt their models due to the impacts of the pandemic. There was a slump in industrial action in Europe in 2020 amid widespread lockdowns, but through 2021 we observed signs of this trend reversing. A rise in job losses and the cost of borrowing in 2022 would make it harder for businesses to meet demands from unions, increasing the likelihood of strikes and walkouts.

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK have high levels of union membership by regional standards. This has correlated with high rates of industrial action, particularly in Belgium, and we forecast that these economies will be the most disrupted by strikes in 2022. Although Spain and France have comparatively low rates of union membership, unions there are very active in organising large and prolonged strikes. Indeed, alongside Belgium,France as Europe’s highest rate of lost workdays to industrial action in per
capita terms.

The cultural and ideological clashes that marked the gubernatorial election in Virginia in November is a portent of what seems almost certain to come ahead of the midterms. While it is possible that Mr Biden will improve his position in the polls and build a broader base of public approval, it is very unlikely that he will be able to prevent the kind of rancorous politics from political leaders that will stoke polarity and energise extremist narratives and action. 

The severe civil unrest of the past two years, particularly riots over systemic racial issues, police violence and the Capitol insurrection, is unlikely to be repeated with the same intensity in 2022 under the Biden presidency. But the social and economic conditions, grievances, divisions, ideologies and spread of misinformation that gave rise to such disorder still remain. Which means the potential for outbreaks over hair trigger issues – from police violence to renewed or tightened Covid-19 restrictions – will almost certainly stay high throughout 2022.

The manifestation of highly charged political clashes and culture wars into tangible security threats is very unlikely to just be limited to disorder on the streets in 2022. The FBI has said that between the spring of 2020 and September 2021 it had more more than doubled its domestic terrorism caseload to around 2,700 investigations. And that the dominant threat in the US is from lone actors, ranging from homegrown violent extremists radicalised by jihadist ideologies, to domestic violent extremists radicalised by personalised grievances ranging from racial and ethnic bias to anti-government, anti-authority sentiment, to conspiracy theories. 

The scale of the rise in such extremism is clearly a major concern and points to a high likelihood of violent lone actor attacks in 2022. It also raises questions as to the extent to which the conspiracist and anti-governance populist narratives in mainstream discourse, which came to define Donald Trump’s politics, sustains and triggers domestic violent extremism. The insurrection at the Capitol showed quite clearly that it does. This is significant because we anticipate that many republican candidates campaigning for the midterm elections will align themselves closely to Mr Trump and his brand of politics to win votes. 

Indeed, Mr Trump’s influence remains remarkably strong and it is liable to be felt as 2022 progresses. The risk that certain republican figures will adopt the Trump playbook and question the integrity of the midterm elections and contest unfavourable results is a negative development to watch. All this will depend on which candidates emerge and how many are the former president’s chosen ones. The campaigns in the battleground states of Arizona, Florida, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin will be the ones to watch. 

There is no certainty that this broadly negative political and security outlook will fully come to pass. The fact that Donald Trump, as a polarising and inflammatory president, is no longer in office does temper the risks somewhat. But there are few convincing signs that what is driving social and political discontent and division in America at a deeper level will change much in 2022. Even if Mr Biden passes his social safety net and climate bills in Q1, as seems likely albeit in a watered down form, it will be too soon to see their intended dividends in 2022.◼

The US has witnessed a significant rise in political violence and violent crime since 2020. The exceptional circumstances of the pandemic suggest that these risks are more likely than not to recede to some degree in 2022, as the country recovers and attains a higher degree of resilience against further Covid-19 outbreaks. But socio-economic trends and aggravating political activity through 2020 and 2021 suggest the risks of civil disorder, terrorism and violent crime are all likely to remain at elevated levels. 

Deepening inequality is a key risk factor. Despite positive signs of recovery, not least economic output, large segments of the population are lagging behind in the so-called K-shaped recovery. Millions of Americans became unemployed in 2020 and, while the job market is recovering, there remains significant disparities. Data points to Blacks and Hispanic people, as well as millennials, mothers and low-wage workers in the service industry, in particular falling behind. The rebounding jobs market is also heavily skewed to white collar workers. In June 2021, employment for low-wage workers had fallen by 21% from January 2020 levels, while employment for high-income workers had risen 9.6%.

Another indicator of the governance challenges and civil stability risks that lies ahead is rates of violent crime, which on current trends will probably remain high in the coming year. FBI data indicates that violent crime as well as gun sales rose in 2020 and 2021. It also revealed in 2021 that the number of murders in the US jumped by nearly 30% in 2020 compared with the previous year, the largest single-year increase ever recorded. The high murder rate was also diffused across the country, albeit in the parts of those cities that had high murder rates already, pointing to wider systemic issues.

Much of this violence was driven by firearms, with nearly 77% of murders being committed with a gun. FBI data of pre-sale background checks indicated a 77% increase in checks from March 2019 to to March 2021. It is unclear what has driven this market trend but a combination of factors in the context of the pandemic almost certainly accounts for it. Not least among them are concerns over rising crime rates and civil unrest amid a surge in unemployment and goods shortages, the mental health crisis caused by the pandemic, and concerns about gun control.

Whatever the causes are of rising gun ownership, it appears to reflect a wider and deeper issue of depleted levels of confidence in security and trust within US society, and towards the government and public institutions. Many people are angry and losing patience, particularly over the pandemic and Mr Biden’s handling of it, and the perceived threats to their civil liberties and livelihoods. Taken together with widening inequalities and rising hardships, these compounding and self-reinforcing issues provide fertile ground for Mr Trump’s divisive brand of populism to play a major role in elections and political campaigning in the year ahead.