Images: Getty Images (Daniel Berehulak; AFP)
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A terrorist attack in an Indian city is a more likely scenario in 2022 than we have assessed for a decade.
The state of governance in India is not just a matter of economics, domestic stability and security risks, but also of geopolitical consequence. India’s strategic competition with China will almost certainly intensify, spurred by the ideology that lies at the root of Mr Modi’s domestic policy agenda as much as China’s assertive strategy to build its economic and political dominance across Asia.
India’s democratic standing should to some extent offset its military and economic asymmetries with China. But Mr Modi’s policies risk undermining India’s soft power, growth, and ability to position itself as a compelling alternative economic partner to China. His erosion of freedoms and minority rights are also points of friction with the US. It is unlikely this will forestall US engagement with India as a key player in its own strategy towards China, but it illustrates that US-India relations are likely to be complex.
Probable tensions between China and India over military activities on their borders will help with the US’ efforts to build stronger strategic and defence relations. But India will most likely remain a non-allied partner to the US, balancing strategic relationships and defence ties with the US and Russia. We anticipate that India will maintain a position as an independent regional leader, ostensibly defending the regional order, rather than a US ally in Sino-US competition.
The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan was a major setback for the US in the region, but the greatest consequence in 2022 will almost certainly be worsening security threats in neighbouring countries. The probability of terrorist groups flourishing in the country again is very high, and the extent to which the US and its allies can contain threats emanating from Afghanistan in 2022 is likely to be very limited.
Afghanistan is a failing state and faces a chronic humanitarian crisis. A serious near-term challenge to Taliban rule is a remote scenario in 2022, even though conflicts and opposition along ethnic divides in northern and eastern provinces are probable. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) will probably pose the greatest threat to Taliban control in 2022. The Taliban’s dissolution and persecution of Afghan security forces is already proving ill-judged, yielding potentially thousands of trained fighters to IS-K.
IS-K has so far been a largely parochial Afghan group. This is likely to slowly change in 2022 as foreign fighters enter the country, enabling it to pose a wider external threat in the coming years. Other terrorist factions are also likely to benefit from this influx. The Taliban retained close ties to Al-Qaeda and other groups that supported its insurgency and these now have more space and time to focus resources on other campaigns.
The Taliban learned the cost of providing safe haven to Al-Qaeda in 2001, but it can be reasonably confident it will not face another such invasion. It shows few credible signs it will curtail like-minded terrorist groups unless it perceives them a threat. President Biden’s assurances of ‘over the horizon’ measures to remotely deal with threats in Afghanistan are likely to prove hard to fulfil without local partners in 2022. So while US missile strikes on terrorists in Afghanistan are possible, attempts to make the Taliban work in its interests or punish it seem more viable near term options the US is likely to pursue.
The paradox of the Taliban’s victory in 2021 is that it was a successful outcome for Pakistan’s security establishment. Yet it is Pakistan that is most likely to feel the worst repercussions. The security services there have long backed the Taliban. But several million Afghan refugees will probably try to enter the country in 2022, further destabilising border areas, exacerbating the terrorist threat, and putting economic pressure on the government.
Over the past 20 years, Pakistan’s support for militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir has been driven by a strategic aim of curtailing Indian influence. Yet a result of this policy has been deepening radicalisation and sectarianism within Pakistan. It has also soured relations with the US, which in 2022 is likely to strongly limit its engagement with Islamabad to transactional conversations about what Pakistan is doing to support US strategic interests in Afghanistan and India.
It is unclear the extent to which Pakistan, and more specifically its military intelligence services, will be able to control or influence the Taliban, particularly when it comes to countering the threat from the Pakistani Taliban (the TTP). If its attacks in 2021 provide any indication, the TTP will benefit from insecurity in Afghanistan and further increase its capability to attack cities in Pakistan and bolster operations in the border areas, posing a direct threat to international (including Chinese) targets, minorities and the state.
The greater threat for regional security in our estimation will, however, be from groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan intent on attacks in and against India. Terrorist violence in Kashmir increased in late 2021 and we anticipate this will continue with an intensified effort by terrorists to target India. An attack in an Indian city is a more likely scenario in 2022 than we have assessed for a decade. Such an outcome would risk a standoff between the neighbouring nuclear powers, keeping India-Pakistan tensions a key geopolitical flashpoint to watch.
The impact of such a deteriorating security situation is that FDI into Pakistan will probably continue to decline. And the country’s geoeconomic strategies, including its regional connectivity plans, are also likely to falter. This all points to greater economic dependence on China in 2022, inhibiting any prospects for improving trade and relations with India and achieving broader economic recovery in 2022.
Despite coming under such pressures, we forecast that the Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan, will remain in office in 2022. The opposition Pakistan Democratic Movement is likely to struggle to gain the necessary momentum in public protests to force his resignation. At the same time, the government is likely to expand its use of authoritarian measures to suppress dissent online and offline. Such a doubling down on autocratic behaviour in pursuit of a more immediately manageable future may prove to be one thing South Asia’s leaders find in common.◼
There were at least 847 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in 2021, according to our TerrorismTracker data.
A terrorist attack in an Indian city is a more likely scenario in 2022 than we have assessed for a decade.
There were at least 847 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in 2021, according to our TerrorismTracker data.
The paradox of the Taliban’s victory in 2021 is that it was a successful outcome for Pakistan’s security establishment. Yet it is Pakistan that is most likely to feel the worst repercussions. The security services there have long backed the Taliban. But several million Afghan refugees will probably try to enter the country in 2022, further destabilising border areas, exacerbating the terrorist threat, and putting economic pressure on the government.
Over the past 20 years, Pakistan’s support for militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir has been driven by a strategic aim of curtailing Indian influence. Yet a result of this policy has been deepening radicalisation and sectarianism within Pakistan. It has also soured relations with the US, which in 2022 is likely to strongly limit its engagement with Islamabad to transactional conversations about what Pakistan is doing to support US strategic interests in Afghanistan and India.
It is unclear the extent to which Pakistan, and more specifically its military intelligence services, will be able to control or influence the Taliban, particularly when it comes to countering the threat from the Pakistani Taliban (the TTP). If its attacks in 2021 provide any indication, the TTP will benefit from insecurity in Afghanistan and further increase its capability to attack cities in Pakistan and bolster operations in the border areas, posing a direct threat to international (including Chinese) targets, minorities and the state.
The greater threat for regional security in our estimation will, however, be from groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan intent on attacks in and against India. Terrorist violence in Kashmir increased in late 2021 and we anticipate this will continue with an intensified effort by terrorists to target India. An attack in an Indian city is a more likely scenario in 2022 than we have assessed for a decade. Such an outcome would risk a standoff between the neighbouring nuclear powers, keeping India-Pakistan tensions a key geopolitical flashpoint to watch.
The impact of such a deteriorating security situation is that FDI into Pakistan will probably continue to decline. And the country’s geoeconomic strategies, including its regional connectivity plans, are also likely to falter. This all points to greater economic dependence on China in 2022, inhibiting any prospects for improving trade and relations with India and achieving broader economic recovery in 2022.
Despite coming under such pressures, we forecast that the Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan, will remain in office in 2022. The opposition Pakistan Democratic Movement is likely to struggle to gain the necessary momentum in public protests to force his resignation. At the same time, the government is likely to expand its use of authoritarian measures to suppress dissent online and offline. Such a doubling down on autocratic behaviour in pursuit of a more immediately manageable future may prove to be one thing South Asia’s leaders find in common.◼
The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan was a major setback for the US in the region, but the greatest consequence in 2022 will almost certainly be worsening security threats in neighbouring countries. The probability of terrorist groups flourishing in the country again is very high, and the extent to which the US and its allies can contain threats emanating from Afghanistan in 2022 is likely to be very limited.
Afghanistan is a failing state and faces a chronic humanitarian crisis. A serious near-term challenge to Taliban rule is a remote scenario in 2022, even though conflicts and opposition along ethnic divides in northern and eastern provinces are probable. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) will probably pose the greatest threat to Taliban control in 2022. The Taliban’s dissolution and persecution of Afghan security forces is already proving ill-judged, yielding potentially thousands of trained fighters to IS-K.
IS-K has so far been a largely parochial Afghan group. This is likely to slowly change in 2022 as foreign fighters enter the country, enabling it to pose a wider external threat in the coming years. Other terrorist factions are also likely to benefit from this influx. The Taliban retained close ties to Al-Qaeda and other groups that supported its insurgency and these now have more space and time to focus resources on other campaigns.
The Taliban learned the cost of providing safe haven to Al-Qaeda in 2001, but it can be reasonably confident it will not face another such invasion. It shows few credible signs it will curtail like-minded terrorist groups unless it perceives them a threat. President Biden’s assurances of ‘over the horizon’ measures to remotely deal with threats in Afghanistan are likely to prove hard to fulfil without local partners in 2022. So while US missile strikes on terrorists in Afghanistan are possible, attempts to make the Taliban work in its interests or punish it seem more viable near term options the US is likely to pursue.
The state of governance in India is not just a matter of economics, domestic stability and security risks, but also of geopolitical consequence. India’s strategic competition with China will almost certainly intensify, spurred by the ideology that lies at the root of Mr Modi’s domestic policy agenda as much as China’s assertive strategy to build its economic and political dominance across Asia.
India’s democratic standing should to some extent offset its military and economic asymmetries with China. But Mr Modi’s policies risk undermining India’s soft power, growth, and ability to position itself as a compelling alternative economic partner to China. His erosion of freedoms and minority rights are also points of friction with the US. It is unlikely this will forestall US engagement with India as a key player in its own strategy towards China, but it illustrates that US-India relations are likely to be complex.
Probable tensions between China and India over military activities on their borders will help with the US’ efforts to build stronger strategic and defence relations. But India will most likely remain a non-allied partner to the US, balancing strategic relationships and defence ties with the US and Russia. We anticipate that India will maintain a position as an independent regional leader, ostensibly defending the regional order, rather than a US ally in Sino-US competition.